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to the corporation at capital gain rates?
The regulations provide that "When . . .
a person ceases to be a beneficiary, stock
owned by him shall not thereafter be con-
sidered, owned by the estate ... ." ' Ap-
parently the executor can satisfy the bequest
to the brother, and the rule attributing the
brother's stock to the estate will no longer
apply.
Conclusion
The changes in the income tax law
brought about by the 1954 Code require an
extremely thoughtful consideration of the
income tax characteristics of each asset
which passes through an estate, whether the
item is a marketable stock, a Series E bond,
a municipal bond, an installment contract,
a restricted stock option or stock of a closely
held corporation. In handling each item,
one should be aware of the possibility of
the effect of a constructive sale or a dis-
tribution which carries with it the attributes
of a distribution of estate income.
One should also keel) in mind the effect
of the broadening of the application of the
"income in respect of a decedent" concept
with regard to installment contracts, stock
options and partnership income. The avail-
ability of loss carry-overs and excess deduc-
tions on termination is also very significant.
One should realize, however, that where an
estate is poured over into a living trust or a
life insurance trust, as is the case with the
Bernard Butterfield estate, or into a residu-
ary trust, excess deductions on termination
are usually not available to the beneficiaries
of the trust. The excess deductions on ter-
mination do, however, reduce the distribit-
able net income of the trust and may permit
distribution of tax-free trust income to the
trust beneficiaries. - [The End]
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W ITH EVERY S\VEET there comes
some bitter. The opportunity, yes even
the obligation, to exercise discretions, to
make elections, oftentimes carries with it
serious responsibilities. Is the executor
qualified by experience and training to as-
sume and discharge such obligations? In
fairness to the executor, ought the testator
place upon him such responsibilities without
setting forth an adequate guide? Does the
testator wish to favor one beneficiary over
another, give a preference to income belie-
ficiaries over remaindermen? What is his
intent and how clearly has he made it known
to the draftsman of his will? The obliga-
tion, real or implied, to apportion, to allo-
Regs. See. 1.318-3.
cate, to adjust, to require contribution in
the absence of local statute in order to restore
the relative positions of income beneficiaries
and of remaindermen, is one determined by
local law and practice; it is not one for
Congressional determination. Especially is
the obligation grave where a formula type
of marital deduction provision has been
made for the widow, and the residuary
estate is held in trust for others.'
Not all discretionary powers given by a
testator may be exercised freely by the
executor. New York, in Section 125 of its
Decedent Estate Law, has provided that the
attempted grant to an executor or testa-
mentary trustee of a power to make a bind-
ing and conclusive fixation of the value of
any asset for purposes of distribution, allo-
cation or otherwise shall be deemed contrary
to public policy.
The basic philosophy underlying the 1954
Code is, aside from producing revenue, that
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when income is generated, he who reaps the
ultimate benefit shall pay the tax.
A rule, which has grown into the body of
our case law and has been adopted by statute
in many states, is that one who is compelled
to pay or satisfy the whole or to pay more
than his just share of a common burden or
obligation upon which several persons are
equally liable, or which they are bound to
discharge, is entitled to contribution against
the others to obtain from them payment of
their respective shares. This doctrine had
its origin in courts of equity upon the prin-
ciple that equality among those in aequali
jure is deemed to be equity.
Elections to Take Administration Expenses
as Income Tax Deductions
The election by the executor to treat ad-
ministration expenses as an income tax de-
duction may sometimes operate to increase
the marital deduction and, thus, effect an
estate tax saving. The Internal Revenue
Service in Rev. Rul. 55-643, 1955-2 CB 386,
ruled that administration expenses treated
as income tax deductions should not be sub-
tracted from the gross estate in order to
determine the adjusted gross estate.
The effect of the ruling may be seen in
the following example: Assume that the
gross taxable estate is valued at $800,000
and that the debts, claims and administra-
tion expenses total $60,000. If $40,000 of
administration expenses are used as an in-
come tax deduction, the adjusted gross
estate will be $780,000 instead of $740,000.
If the election is not used, the maximum
marital deduction will be $370,000; if the
election under Section 642(g) is used, the
maximum marital deduction will be $390,000.
The effect of the foregoing ruling is to give
the surviving spouse more than one half of
the distributable estate, namely, $390,000 in-
stead of $370,000. Not only has the federal
estate tax been increased by the use of the
election, but the residuary estate has addi-
tionally been reduced by the increase, namely
$20,000, in the amount distributable to the
widow under the formula bequest and the
executor's deduction.
The ruling is predicated on the assump-
tion that the increased amount resulting
from the election constitutes an "interest in
property which . . . passed from the dece-
dent." The ruling also suggests that bene-
ficiaries other than the widow might have
the right under the local law to question the
authority of the executor to decrease their
interests under the will by increasing the
widow's share.
Federal Tax Conference
The courts are increasingly recognizing
that the use of the election under Section
642(g) may give the estate a present net
tax advantage but do injustice to the in-
terests of some of those beneficially interested
in the estate.. The first such case reported
was In re Warms' Estate, 140 N. Y. S. (2d)
169 (Surr. Ct. N. Y. Cty., March 4, 1955).
The pecuniary trust for the widow in this
case did not involve a marital deduction
formula clause and, therefore, the sole detri-
ment to estate principal resulting from the
election was due to the increase in the fed-
eral estate tax. The court held that there
should be charged against income account
and credited to principal account an amount
equivalent to the detriment suffered by the
principal account as the result of the elec-
tion. However, the court allowed the in-
come account to retain that portion of the
increase in income after taxes resulting from
the election which remained after making
the equitable adjustment. In California a
similar problem in principle was dealt with in
In re Bixby's Estate, 295 Pac. (2d) 68 (DC
of App., 2d Dist., Div. 2, Calif., March 28,
1956, reh'g den.). After citing the Warms
case, the court stated that it adopted the
rule of an equitable allocation of the increase
in the income account resulting from the
election because it places the burden of the
income tax on the income legatee, where it
properly belongs, and obviates any disloca-
tion of the testator's bounty by shifting the
burden of an income tax to a residuary
legatee.
To be distinguished in part from the two
cases cited, a recent New York case, Estate
of Samuel Levy, New York Law Jaurnal,
July 17, 1957, page 3, (Surr. Ct., N. Y. Cty.),
dealt with the adjustments required when a
marital deduction formula clause is used
and expenses are taken as income tax de-
ductions. The court stated that the election
has a different result for tax purposes than
for accounting purposes. The election per-
mitted by the Internal Revenue Code does
not authorize the executor to vary the
interests of the legatees. Estate tax deduc-
tions, the court stated, should not be cred-
ited to the widow's bequest since it is freed
of tax. The executors were directed to
credit the benefit of all deductions, which
would have been available to the estate
principal, to the residuary estate. It may be
questioned, except for the possible operation
of accounting procedures under New York
law, whether the court is wholly correct in
giving all of the benefits to the residuary
estate. If Section 642(g) is not availed of,
estate tax deductions are taken against the
whole estate in arriving at the adjusted
gross estate. If the deductions are less and
the adjusted gross estate is larger because
of the election, the marital share will be
larger but the residuary estate will be re-
stored out of the income tax savings. Thus,
the residuum actually loses dnothing; the
saving i paid for by a lower total tax
burden.
Walter L. Nossaman in Trust Administra-
tion and Taxation, Section 17.03, has stated
that the election of the executor to use ex-
penses of administration as an income
rather than as an estate tax deduction
should not affect the substantive rights of
the beneficiaries of the trust. This view,
he says, is consistent with the principle that
the expenses of administration are primarily
payable from principal rather than from
income of an estate. He believes that in
determining the substantive rights of bene-
ficiaries, the executor's utilization of admin-
istration expenses as income rather than
estate tax deductions should be treated as
irrelevant and the interests of. the benefici-
aries computed in the same manner as
though all such expenses had been paid
from the residue or as the will otherwise
directs.
In some jurisdictions, such as Illinois, the
foregoing conclusion may still require an
adjustment to be made by the executor at
the termination of administration of the ex-
cess income tax savings remaining after full
restoration to corpus.
In determining whether to take adminis-
tration expenses as an income tax deduction
under the provisions of Section 642(g) or to
take them as an estate tax deduction under
Section 2053, it is not sufficient to weigh the
respective tax rates alone. If there is a
formula type of marital trust, there will, in
addition to the increase in estate tax, be a
"swing" of principal from the residuary
estate to the marital share because of the
larger adjusted gross estate. In no event
should the election be made unless the in-
come tax savings resulting therefrom will
be greater than the combined increase in
the amount of the federal estate tax and the
amount of the "swing" from residue to the
marital share.
If the election is made, then the residuary
estate should be wholly restored out of the
income tax savings on the ground that
equality is equity. There should, after this
complete restoration, be left over some ex-
cess of income saved which must ultimately
be subject to adjustment. Accounting pro-
cedures will seemingly require that the ex-
ecutor adjust this excess of income saved
between those who enjoy the income from
both the marital share and the residuary
estate.
Especially is it important that the fore-
going adjustments in their entirety be made
if the income beneficiary of the residuary
trust is not the surviving spouse. The elec-
tion is purely a tax-saving act and does not
alter the substantive rights of the benefi-
ciaries under the will. The restoration, out
of the income saved because of a lower
income tax, to the corpus of the residuary
estate will in fact reduce the amount of the
marital share; the restoration retains cor-
puswise the advantages of the election, but
no beneficiary has suffered a diminution of
his interest. The "swing" back is made
entirely out of tax savings. The adjustments
to be made with respect to the excess of
the income tax saved will be automatic, for
example, in Illinois under the Principal and
Income Act. The bulk of the excess will go
to the residuum, although the marital share
should derive some benefit out of the com-
putation of interest on the formula bequest
at the average rate of return on the whole
estate. In those states which follow the
Massachusetts rule with respect to the dis-
tribution of income earned during the ad-
ministration of the estate, the excess will
presumably follow the income to the bene-
ficiaries of the residuary estate.
It is, as a general rule, the duty of an
executor to administer an estate to the best
advantage of all concerned. Minimizing the
estate's taxes may well be within the line
of duty. The exercise of the election, how-
ever, may carry with it burdens and risks
for the executor which go beyond those
which reasonably attach to his office. In-
come tax accounting and trust accounting
often produce results that bear little re-
semblance to each other.
The intent of the testator is important.
He may well wish to relieve the executor
from the duty of making adjustments. He
may wish to incorporate a direction that
the executor claim as income tax deductions
any expenses of administration whenever,
in the executor's sole judgment, such action
will achieve an over-all reduction in income
and death taxes for the 'benefit of the estate
and of the income beneficiaries thereof. He
may wish to direct that there be no com-
pensating adjustments made between in-
come and principal. If this direction takes
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the form outlined, there will be no "swing"
back to the residuum of the amount of the
increase in the federal estate tax nor the in-
crease in the marital deduction share. If the
testator, in order to protect the fiduciary
and to avoid mere guessing as to what
power the latter has, incorporates a provi-
sion in the will giving the executor the au-
thority in his sole discretion to exercise the
election to take either the income tax de-
ductions or estate tax deductions whenever
the law permits such an election, the execu-
tor must make the accounting adjustments
if the election is used. In the final analysis,
the testator should direct whether or not
such adjustments shall be made. The com-
plications which may arise because of the
impact of the election upon the interests of
beneficiaries are too grave oftentimes for
the testator not to relieve the executor of
some of the risks.
If the executor elects to take administra-
tion expenses as income tax deductions, may
he be deemed to have exercised a power of
appointment? Section 20.2041-1(a) of the
Proposed Federal Estate Tax Regulations
provides that under Section 2041 a dece-
dent's gross estate includes the value of
property in respect of which the decedent
possessed or released certain powers of.ap-
pointment. Section 20.2041-1(b) provides
that the mere power of management, invest-
ment, custody of assets or the power to allo-
cate receipts and disbursements as between
income and principal exercisable in a fiduci-
ary capacity whereby the holder has no
power to enlarge or shift any of the bene-
ficial interests therein except as an incidental
consequence of the discharge of such fidu-
ciary duties, is not a power of appointment.
If the enlargement or shifting of any ben-
eficial interest by an executor is an inci-
dental consequence of the discharge of his
fiduciary duties, such an action is not the
exercise of a power of appointment for
estate tax purposes. But if the executor
elects under Section 642(g) and the adjusted
gross estate is thereby increased in amount,
may this increase in the marital share be
considered an incidental consequence of the
discharge of the executor's fiduciary duties,
especially in the absence of a clear direction
in the will? If the will directs that there
shall be no readjustment of interests, the
executor's election would obviously be inci-
dental to the discharge of his fiduciary
duties.
If the widow has a power of appointment
over the marital deduction share, may any
Federal Tax Conference
specific problem resulting therefrom con-
front the executor in making the election?
It would seem that such a power of appoint-
ment adds no new problems in so far as the
executor is involved. In the absence of a
clear direction in the will, he must still make
his adjustments between the share for the
widow and the residuary trust.
Allocation of Federal Estate Tax
Where There Is Taxable
Nontestamentary Property
In the drafting of wills, unfortunately all
tax clauses are not clear and unambiguous
in declaring the intention of the testator,
especially where there are nontestamentary
assets. The construction of the tax clause
in a will rests upon the question of not what
the testator meant to say, but of what he
meant by what he did say. (Swole v. Burn-
ham, 111 Conn. 120, 122, 149 Atl. 229, 230.)
For federal estate tax purposes, the gross
taxable estate includes not only the value of
property which the testator owned at his
death, but also, property not subject to ad-
ministration or not passing under his will,
such as the dower or curtesy interests of the
surviving spouse and statutory interests in
lieu thereof, transfers in contemplation of
death, transfers taking effect at or after
death, revocable transfers made during the
decedent's lifetime, property owned jointly
with some right of survivorship, property
over which the testator had a power of
appointment and the proceeds of life insur-
ance policies. Under many state inheritance
and estate tax laws, a tax is imposed upon
or with respect to such nontestamentary
benefits.
The basis for the allocation of the estate
tax where there are taxable nontestamentary
assets is cogently discussed in Carpenter v.
Carpenter, 267 S. W. (2d) 632 (Mo., 1954).
The general rule followed in many states
clearly is that in the absence of a state
statute or testamentary provision to the con-
trary, the ultimate burden of the federal
estate tax falls on the residuary estate, but
a testator has the right by testamentary pro-
vision to place the burden of the tax where
he wishes, and the federal estate tax statute
makes provision for the exercise of that
right. The general rule referred to appar-
ently developed during a period in which
many courts construed the federal estate tax
statute as evidencing the intent of Congress
to cast the burden of the tax upon the
residuary estate; but later the Supreme
Court held in Riggs v. Del Drago, 42-2 us'rc
ff 10,219, 317 U. S. 95, 63 S. Ct. 110, that
"Congress intended that state law should
determine the ultimate thrust of the tax."
Some authorities definitely hold that cases
supporting the general rule were based on
an erroneous concept of the Federal Estate
Tax Act and refuse to follow it. Some
states, in an attempt to remedy the situa-
tion which had developed by state court
action prior to the decision in the Riggs
case, adopted statutes providing for the
apportionment of federal estate taxes among
all interested parties in the absence of an
express provision, in the will to the con-
trary; while in some other states the right
to apportionment was judicially determined.
The rule adopted by the Supreme Court of
Ohio is that in the absence of a statute or
a testamentary direction to the contrary,
the federal estate tax on all property within
the testamentary estate will be paid from
the residue; while all nontestamentary inter-
ests will bear only the burden of estate
taxes attributed to them. This seems to be
the more enlightened rule obtaining wider
acceptance by the courts of the various
states.
In the Carpenter case, the court deter-
mined the issues upon equitable principles
stating:
"The probate estate, through the ex-
ecutrix, was not a volunteer in . . . paying
• . . [the estate] tax, since the payment
thereof was required by the federal statutes.
The tax was a tax against whole estate and
a lien against all of the property of the
'gross estate' when the tax was paid. It
was not a debt or a tax against the deceased
or against the property of his probate estate
alone. Prorating the federal estate tax in
this case between the testamentary estate
and the non-testamentary estate seems to
provide a fair and impartial basis for dis-
tribution of the tax burden in question,
where the testator in his will has not (in
our opinion) otherwise provided except as
to devises and bequests under the will. We
have seen that there is nothing in the
federal estate tax statutes to prevent a
proper application of equitable principles to
prevent injustice where the tax is based
upon both testamentary and non-testamentary
property. The mere fact that the executor
has an obligation to pay a particular tax
does not negative a right which he may
have to contribution from someone else on
account of that payment."
The Court concluded that the federal es-
tate tax should be prorated and that the
beneficiaries of the nontestamentary property
should pay the tax attributable to their re-
spective interests therein.
It is interesting to note, as reported in 37
A. L. R. (2d) 171, that in jurisdictions which
have passed upon the question for the first
time since 1942, it is generally held that the
burden of estate taxes must ultimately be
borne by every part of the taxable estate
and' that every beneficiary must pay a pro-
rated share of the tax. The reason why the
doctrine of contribution is applicable with
respect to the federal estate tax is that the
tax is imposed upon the estate as a whole,
the lien of the tax extends to every asset
of the taxable estate and the government
may seize any part of the taxable estate or
enforce payment against any part of the es-
tate. The tax is thus a common burden and
is no more the obligation of one than of
the other obligors. If, therefore, one of the
obligors pays all or more of his share of the
common obligation, he should be permitted
to have contribution from the others. In
many jurisdictions in which the courts had
early held against apportionment of the es-
tate taxes, such jurisdictions have retained
the rule primarily -because of the principle
of stare decisis, but notwithstanding many of
them recognize that there are allowable ex-
ceptions to such a general rule, such as
where the testator leaves no residuary es-
tate or where the tentative residuary estate
is less than the sum due for estate taxes; or
where the residue is real estate, debts and
taxes being required to be paid out of per-
sonalty; or where the decedent's probate
estate is insolvent; or where the decedent
died intestate. With respect to the last ex-
ception, the Indiana court in Pearcy v. Citi-
.ens Bank & Trust Company of Bloomington,
121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N. E. (2d) 918 (1951),
reh'g den., 98 N. E. (2d) 231 (1951), held
that where the decedent left no will, the es-
tate tax must be apportioned equitably be-
tween the probate and nonprobate estates
and between personalty and realty in accord
with the maxim "Equality is equity."
In jurisdictions where taxes may be ap-
portioned and the surviving spouse elects to
take against the will, the value of the elective
share enters into the gross taxable estate,
and if no special deduction is attributable to
her share, the survivor is liable to apportion-
ment on the same basis as an heir or other
beneficiary of the taxable estate. (In re
Gallagher's Will, 57 N. M. 112, 255 Pac. (2d)
317, 37 A. L. R. (2d) 149 (1953). In jurisdic-
tions in which the estate taxes on nontesta-
mentary assets are not apportioned but must
be paid from the residuary estate, it seems
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obvious that the taxes cannot be apportioned
directly against the share which a surviving
spouse receives when electing to take against
the will where there is in fact a residuary
estate. But where the survivor's intestate
share is described by statute as a portion of
the "net estate" or a portion of the estate
after the payment of all just claims, the
share is a portion of what is left after the
deduction of estate taxes as well as debts
and expenses, so that the survivor's share is
diminished proportionately by the tax even
if there is no formal apportionment of taxes.
(Northern Trust Company v. Wilson, 344 Il1.
App. 508, 101 N. E. (2d) 604 (1951); In re
Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N. W. (2d)
641, 37 A. L. R. (2d) 187 (1953).)
In Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122
N. E. (2d) 695 (Ohio, 1954), the court re-
versed previous holdings and held that the
federal estate tax should be deducted before
computing the widow's share where she
elects to take against the will under a statute
allowing her an amount "not to exceed
one-half the net estate," and it is established
that in computing the net estate the federaJ
estate tax is deducted like other debts, and
failure to deduct would result in the widow's
receiving more than one half.
In Illinois the right of the executor to
obtain contribution when there are taxable
nontestameutary assets seems to merit re-
view by the courts. Like most of the mid-
western states, Illinois has no apportionment
statute. A leading case in this area of the
law is that of the People v. Pasfield, 284 Ill.
450, 120 N. E. 286, which was decided in
1918. The decedent died testate in 1916. In
the determination of the inheritance tax
upon his estate, which included only testa-
mentary assets, the appraiser deducted the
Claims- and costs of administration, exclusive
of the amount of the federal estate tax, when
determining the net taxable estate. The
county judge approved the report of the ap-
praisers with one change, namely, the federal
estate tax was deducted from the gross
value of the decedent's property before
computing the amount of inheritance tax
due the state. The sole question before the
court was whether or not the amount paid
the United States as estate tax should' be
first deducted from the appraised value of
the estate before the state inheritance tax
was computed. The court found that the
effect of the federal statute then in force was
to make the death duty an expense or
charge against the estate of the decedent
and not an express charge against the shares
of the legatees or distributees of the dece-
Federal Tax Conference
dent. A number of Illinois cases have since
been decided in which, regardless of the
facts at issue, the oversimplified statement
that the federal estate tax is an expense of
administration has been followed as the
guiding rule.
The federal statute did not invade the
right of the state to require contribution,
nor was the question of the right of the exec-
utor to obtain contribution before the court
in the Pasfield case. Even though it might
be conceded that the nature of the federal
estate tax does not require contribution from
the legatees and devisees of a testate estate,
it does not follow that those who receive
nontestanentary assets will be relieved of
the obligation to assume their proportionate
share of the estate tax burden by way of
contribution. The executor may be required
in equity to allocate this burden between
testamentary and nontestamentary properties.
Northern Trust Company v. Wilson, cited
above, in effect recognizes apportionment of
the estate tax when the widow renounces.
It might be inferred that Pasfield and other
similar Illinois cases have thereby been
limited in their application to a taxable es-
tate containing only testamentary assets.
'Sometimes the testator has been presumed
to have made an intentional gift in con-
templation of death. Where the courts have
found such a gift to have been intentional,
some of them have required contribution on
account of the estate tax on the gift.
Is there a gift tax liability if contribution
is consented to by a donee in the absence of
either a statute or case law requiring con-
tribution and in the absence of a court
decree? If the nontestamentary property is
in trust, the trustee cannot be a volunteer
in making contributions; but if the non-
testamentary property is not in trust, the
recipient may well have made a gift by
consenting to contribution to the estate.
Whether or not joint tenancy property
should be subjected to contribution has re-
ceived little apparent attention from. the
courts. In a recent district court case in
Minnesota, Goodson v. U. S. 57-1 USTC
11,697, the court reasoned that the testator
probably intended to impose a legal obliga-
tion, if he had the power to do so, to impress
the estate tax on nontestamentary property
which included both joint tenancy and inter
vivos transfers in trust. The court reasoned
that any convincing manifestation of local
law having a clear root in judicial conscience
and responsibility, whether resting in direct
expression or obvious implication and infer-
ence, should accordingly be given appropri-
ate heed. Based upon dicta in two Minnesota
cases, it required contribution from both the
surviving joint tenants and the beneficiaries
of the inter vivos trust.
The rationale of the court in the Goodson
case followed in the main the principles
enunciated in Gallagher v. Smith, 55-1 usTC
f9485, 223 F. (2d) 218, (CA-3). In this
decision, the court discussed the different
types of tax cases with respect to which the
effect of state court decisions, even though
differing greatly, will have a bearing upon
their controlling effect upon the federal
courts. Where federal law has imposed no
qualification upon or criterion for the tax-
ability thereof, Congress has made the
operation of the tax law in such a case
solely dependent upon state law. An ad-
judication of such a question of title by a
court of the state must accordingly be given
effect not because it is res judicata against
the United States, but because it is con-
clusive of the parties' property and rights
which alone are to be taxed. Of course, a
state court must first adjudicate the rights
of all parties claiming interest in the income
or property in question, and it must have
had jurisdiction to do so.
A recent case involving the right to con-
tribution and the effect of renunciation by
the widow is Merchants National Bank (Will
of G. E. Street) v. U. S., 57-2 USTC 1 11,703
(CA-7), cert. applied for. The court held
that in the absence of an apportionment
statute in Indiana, the widow's renunciation
caused her share of the estate to bear its
proportionate part of the estate and in-
heritance taxes which, in turn, reduced the
amount of the otherwise allowable marital
deduction by the amount of her proportionate
share of the taxes. The federal court relied
substantially upon decrees which were en-
tered in the state court.
Widow's Award
In the absence of an apportionment statute
or direction in the will, the widow's award
does not bear any part of the estate tax;
it is paid out of testamentary assets. Unless
paid out of income, it is a charge against
the estate, although it is not under present
law deductible in arriving at the net taxable
estate under the estate tax statute.. If not
paid out of income, the election by the
executor to take administration expenses as
an income tax deduction under Section
642(g) in itself has no effect. If the award
qualifies for the marital deduction, the
amount of the formula bequest to be set up
out of testamentary assets will be reduced
by the amount of the spouse's award, the
dollar amount thereof being the same whether
or not an election is made. If the award
is paid out of income, which may be done
in some states, the election under Section
642(g) will undoubtedly require accounting
adjustments within the area of the applicable
principles and procedures heretofore dis-
cussed.
In many instances, as a practical matter,
the executor's views with respect to the
amount of the award will have some bearing
on the amount allowed by the court. If
there is a formula bequest, for the spouse
and if the entire award qualifies for the
marital deduction, the executor's views may
be said to have had some effect upon the net
amount set aside for the widow's testa-
mentary share of the estate. If the award
does not qualify for the marital deduction,
its size will give the spouse more than the
intended marital share if the will provides
for the maximum deduction. Of this latter
possibility, both the testator and the drafts-
man should be fully aware.
What to Do?
The recent report of the Committee on
Draftsmanship: Wills and Trusts of the
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association, of
which Mr. Harrison F. Durand of New
York was the 'chairman, is "must" reading
for the lawyer who drafts wills.
The report very aptly states that the func-
tion of the lawyer-draftsman is not that of a
mere scrivener who reduces to writing in
legal form the estate plans conceived by
others; on the contrary, the draftsman is the
heart of the estate planning team. The
probate bar must accept this responsibility
and train itself to the point of understanding
the elements which entered into a complex
estate plan and the legal principles which
are applicable thereto.
In its discussion of the marital deduction,
the committee cites the advantages claimed
by adherents: of the formula-clause share of
the residue type, and it also summarizes
the disadvantages of the use of this clause.
Notwithstanding that the share bequeathed
to the wife is uncertain and that the use of
the formula clause may create conflicts of
interest between the widow and other
residuary legatees and that the share of the
widow will depend upon whether the exec-
utor uses administration expenses as an
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income tax deduction, the formula clause
has wide usage and will presumably be in
use for a long time to come. Wise drafting,
a clear and unambiguous declaration of intent
on the part of the testator, a comprehendible
delineation of the duties, the limitations and
the risks imposed upon the executor become
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W117iTH THE ENACTME'NT of Sub-
)chapter K of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, major strides were made in the
clarification of the principles applicable in
the taxation of partnerships. This clarifica-
tion, with its attending possibilities for
accurately forecasting the tax consequences
of various provisions in partnership agree-
ments, places a substantial premium upon
advance planning of partnership transac-
tions. This is true in the case of professional
partnerships as well as commercial partner-
ships generally. Despite the fact that the
major portion of income earned by pro-
fessional partnerships will be noncapital
in nature, other areas are available to the
members of such partnerships in which tax
planning may result both in the avoidance
of particular tax difficulties and in the ac-
complishment of particular and favorable
tax results.
Planning
for Sharing Partnership Profits
Under the 1954 Code, partners are granted
wide latitude in agreeing upon the methods
for sharing partnership profits and losses.
In professional partnerships, which are es-
sentially organizations engaged in render-
ing personal services, the sharing of losses
is usually not a serious factor since the
firm will usually cease to exist within a
relatively short period after losses begin to
11954 Code See. 704(b)(2). See also Regs.
Sec. 1.704-1(a)(2).
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be consistently incurred. Therefore, for
planning purposes, the various possibilities
for sharing profits of the firm will be of
more interest to the partners, although the
same general considerations will usually be
applicable as well to the sharing of losses.
The statute' sets forth the one basic
limitation upon the right of the partners to
agree among themselves as to the sharing
of items of current income. Such agree-
ients must not be designed principally to
avoid or evade federal income taxes. The
regulations2 contain various factors which
will be considered in a particular case in
determining whether or not this forbidden
purpose exists. For example, the presence
or absence of a business purpose motivating
the agreement, as well as the presence or
absence of substantial economic effect, will
play an important role in determining the
validity of the agreement.
Since the professional partnership will
usually be concerned with siimply allocating
the amount of its ordinary income among
its members, the principal effect of the
1954 Code is to remove any doubt as to the
right of the parties to enter into special allo-
cation agreements as long as they have a
business purpose and substantial economic
(as contrasted with income tax) effect.
On the basis of the statute and regula-
tions, it would seem clear, for example, that
the partners by agreement could encourage
certain of their number who were responsi-
ble for the production of new business, by
entering into an agreement which \vould
provide for one set of percentages of in-
terest in income earned tip to a specified
amount, with a different set of percentages
2 Regs. See. 1.704-1(a) (2).
